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Justice For the Sea Turtle:
Marine Conservation and the Court
of International Trade
Paul Stanton Kibel*

I.
INTRODUCTION: THE PLAINTIFF SURFACES

. On April 10, 1996, the United States Court of International
Trade (CIT) issued a landmark decision in Earth Island Institute
v. Christopher. 1 In this case, the CIT ordered the U.S. State,
Commerce, and Treasury Departments to block the importation
of shrimp from all nations that had not adopted adequate policies
to protect sea turtles. 2 Worldwide, over one hundred thousand
sea turtles are killed each year as a result of shrimp-harvesting
operations: the turtles drown trying to escape the shrimp nets~3
The CIT based its ruling on an interpretation of a 1989 amendment to the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), § 609.4 Sec* Adjunct Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco).
J.D., Willamette; B.A., Colgate. The author thanks Nicole Walthall and Deborah
Sivas (Attorneys, Conservation Law Project), Judge Thomas Aquilino (U.S. Court
of International Trade), Todd Steiner (Director, Sea Turtle Restoration Project) and
Steve Charnovitz (Director, Yale's Global Environment and Trade Study) for their
comments on the first draft of this article.
1. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). The
April 1996 decision was a hearing to determine whether to grant a one-year extension to the CIT's December 1995 ruling, Earth Island Inst. v. Christoph~r, 913 F.
Supp. 559 (Ct. In!'l Trade 1995). Thus, the December 1995 and April 1996 CIT
decisions are really two aspects of a single litigation. To indicate their relatedness,
and to avoid unnecessary confUSion, the two decisions are collectively referred to as
Earth Island v. Christopher in the text of this article.
2. See Earth Island InsL, 922 F. Supp. at 627.
3. See id. at 624 (citing Earth Island InsL, 913 F. Supp. at 568). See also Turtles in
the Soup, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16. 1996, at 64; see also Giant Legal Victory for Sea
Turtles!, VIVA LA TORTUGA (Sea Thrtle Restoration Project, San Francisco, Cal.),
Issue No. 11996, at 1 [hereinafter VIVA LA TORTUGAJ.
4. See Earth Island InsL, 922 F. Supp. at 617 (citing Conservation of Sea ThrtIes;
Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 1988,1037 (1989) (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537)). Technically, the 1991 sea turtle amendments were not
formal amendments to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), because they were
adopted and codified as free-standing legislation. The Court ~f International Trade,
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tion 609 created a shrimp "certification" program, wherein
nations desiring to export shrimp to the U.S. must be certified by
the U.S. government.5 The U.S. government can only provide
this certification if the exporting nation can demonstrate that it
harvests shrimp using methods that provide a level of protection
to sea tuitles comparable to protection provided for under U.S.
conservation laws.6 Absent proof of comparable turtle protection laws, the U.S. government is required to ban shrimp
imports.7
Although § 609 requires that the shrimp certification be in
place by May 1991, U.S. agencies did not meet this deadline. 8
Instead, they adopted regulations to limit the nations to which
§ 609 applied, and to delay the application of the certification!
embargo provisions to these nations. 9 The plaintiffs in Earth Island challenged the legality of the government's limiting and delaying regulations, alleging that such regulations were
inconsistent with the plain language and requirements of § 609.1 0
The CIT agreed with the plaintiffs, and ordered the State, Commerce, and Treasury Departments to implement the certification
and import ban programs by May 1, 1996.11
The Earth Island litigation is significant for at least three reasons. First, it establishes the CIT as the leading judicial forum,
and most likely the exclusive trial court, for resolving legal issues
surrounding trade-based environmental restrictions. Given the
emerging nexus, both legally and economically, between international trade and the environment, this jurisdictional point is
likely to take on ever-increasing importance. Second, on the issue of standing for environmental advocates, the Earth Island dehowever, concluded that because the 1991 amendments were based in part on the
ESA listing and habitat scheme, and because the amendments furthered the policy
objectives of the ESA, they should be treated as part of the ESA regime. See also
infra note 30.
5. See Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609(b).
6. See id. § 609(b).
7. See id. § 609(b).
8. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2. According to Nicole Walthall, an attorney for Earth Island Institute, "The Administration had thwarted the will of Congress and the American people by not enforcing this law which is aimed at the global
protection of endangered and threatened sea turtles." [d.
9. Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for
the Protection of ThrtIes in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015-16,
(1993).
10. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616, 626 (Ct. Int'I Trade
1996).
11. See id. at 627.
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cision provided an important clarification of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.12 More
specifically, it found that the Lujan decision was not a significant
obstacle for environmental plaintiffs seeking review of U.S. government actions, so long as the remedy sought was likely to further or protect the plaintiffs' specific interests. Third, the CIT
decision is significant for the arguments and legal principles that
the court chose to reject. Most noteworthy was the CIT's rejection of the agencies' inadequate time and resources defense, and
its conclusion that the shrimp certification program did not compromise U.S. international trade obligations.
This article will explore the origins and likely implications of
the CIT's ruling in Earth Island. First, it will examine the threat
posed to sea turtles by international shrimp fishing practices, and
the U.S. Congressional response to this threat. Next, it will summarize the history and outcome of the Earth Island decision. Finally, the article will discuss the emerging conflict between § 609
and the rules of international trade, in particular the rules established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 13
II.
SEA TURTLES UNDER THREAT: THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE

The population of sea turtles worldwide is threatened by destructive fishing practices. 14 The scientific community now recognizes that several species of sea turtles are now facing possible
extinction.15 It is estimated that over 125,000 turtles die every
year, not to serve as food for people, but because they are hauled
in (and drowned) as unwanted bycatch for target catch such as
shrimp and tuna. 16 As such, the sea turtles are a casualty of industrial fishing practices, of technology designed to increase the
efficiency and decrease the expense of harvesting marketable target fish .products and seafood.
12. 504 u.s. 553 (1992).
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
14. See Katherine Bishop, LawsuitSeeks Ban on Shrimp Imports: Group Asks to
Curb Nations Not Protecting Sea Turtles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,1992 at A13 [hereinafter Bishop].
15. See generally WEBER, CROUSE, IRWIN & IUDICELLO, DELAY AND DENIAL: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF SEA TURTLES AND SHRIMP FISHING (1995).
16. See id.

60

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 15:57

According to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a
U.S. Commerce Department subagency responsible for implementing the federal Endangered Species Act, there are currently
at least four species of sea turtles that now face possible extinction: the loggerhead, the green leatherback, the hawksbill and
the Kemp's ridleyP Of these species, the Kemp's ridley turtle is
the mo&t threatened, with fewer than 1500 nesting turtles remaining in the wild. 18
In terms of industrial fishing, there are two fish harvesting
practices that have had particularly harsh impacts on sea turtles.
The first is the use of large-scale pelagic nets. The second is the
use of mechanized shrimp trawlers. The United States has
played a leadership role in enacting domestic laws to reduce the
destructive impact of these industrial fishing practices on sea
turtles.1 9
Large-scale pelagic driftnets are giant nets, sometimes extending for thirty miles and reaching forty feet in depth, that entrap everything that swims or drifts into their path.20 "[O]ne of
the most deadly fishing methods ever developed,"21 driftnets,
sometimes called "curtains of death," are now the subject of several pieces of U.S. legislation.22 First, the U.S. has banned all
U.S. fishing vessels (ships officially registered with the U.S.) from
using driftnets, whether the vessels operate in U.S., international,
or foreign waters.23 The U.S. has also adopted two laws that provide for import bans, as well as other sanctions, against the fish
products of countries that permit the use of driftnets.24 These
laws, the Marine Mammal Protection Act25 and the High Seas
17. State Department Guidelines Implement Sea Turtle Decision, Int'! Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 17, at 687 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter BNA Int'I Trade Rep.-Apr. 1996].
18. See TURTLE EXPERT WORKING GROUP, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SER.
VICE, A REPORT OF THE TURTLE EXPERT WORKING GROUP: RESULTS OF A SERIES
OF DELIBERATIONS HELD IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, JUNE 1995 - JUNE 1996 (July 2,1996).
19. For discussion of these laws, see infra notes 20-32.
20. See Pelagic Driftnet Fisheries 1985: Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy
Study Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Tramp., 99th Congo 10
(1985) (statement of William G. Gordon, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce).
21. See LINDA PAUL, EARTI-ITRUST, HIGH SEAS DRIFTNETTING: PLUNDER OF THE
GLOBAL COMMONS iii 0991) [hereinafter PLUNDER].
22. See Robert Eisenbud, Problems and Prospects for the Pelagic Driftnet, 12 B.c.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 473, 474 (1985).
23. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Managment Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1857(1)(M) (1996). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1996).
24. See infra notes 25-26.
25. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.c.A. § 1361 (1972).
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Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act,26 have proven effective in
encouraging other nations and the international community to
better respond to the environmental threats of driftnet fishing.
More specifically, U.S. leadership helped induce the United Nations General Assembly to adopt resolutions in 1989 and 1991
calling for a global moratorium on large-scale use of driftnets on
the high seas.27
The lesson of the purse-seine net issue is that, in the field of
international environmental diplomacy, the progressive policies
of individual countries can serve as a catalyst to global awareness
and consensus. As Hilary French, Senior Researcher at the
WorldWatch Institute, has observed, "it is most often a unilateral action by one country, sometimes backed by trade measures
against others, that eventually spurs the international community
to act collectively."28 These points were echoed by the Canadian Environmental Law Association's Steven Shrybman:
"[e]nvironmental progress in one jurisdiction has often created a
'follow-the-Ieader' dynamic in which other jurisdictions are pres.
sured to conform to the higher standard."29
On the issue of shrimp trawlers, U.S. regulation has focused
primarily on mandating or encouraging the use of turtle-exclusion devices (TEDs). TEDs are metal trap-doors attached to
shrimp nets that enable turtles to escape and thereby' avoid
drowning.3 o It is estimated that TEDs can reduce sea turtle mortality from shrimp fishing operations by ninety-seven percent.31
26. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat.
4900 (1992).
27. See G.A. Res. 44/225, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f) (1990),
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990); G.A. Res. 46/216, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Agenda Item 77(e) (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992). These U.N. resolutions called for "immediate cessation of further expansion of large-scale pelagic
driftnet fishing on the high seas of the North Pacific and all other high seas outside
the Pacific Ocean ...." For a good discussion of the international driftnet issue, see
Leslie A. Davis, Note, North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the High Seas
Controversy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1057 (1991). For a discussion of how unilateral
environmental leadership can impact international environmental consensus-build.
ing, see infra notes 27-30;
28. Hilary F. French, The GATT: Menace or Ally?, WORLDWATCH MAG., 14
(Sept.lOct. 1991).
29. Steven Shrybman, Trading Away the Environment, WORLD POLICY J. 93, 105
(Winter 1991-92).
30. Jane Kay, Rare Turtles Figure in Trade Pact, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 18, 1993, at
A4.
31. Environmentalists Win CIT Decision That Could Yield Shrimp Import Bans,
Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan. 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaevr
File.
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In 1987, the NMFS promulgated regulations under the federal
Endangered Species Act (ESA) that required the entire U.S.
shrimp fishing fleet to use TEDs.32 In 1989, Congress adopted
legislation that took the NMFS' TED regulations one step
further.33
In 1989, Congress created a "certification" program to encourage foreign countries to upgrade their sea turtle protection
practices and technology. The heart of the 1989 turtle protection
program is found in § 609, which sets forth two basic requirements. First, § 609(a) requires the Secretary of State to initiate
negotiations with all foreign countries to develop treaties to protect sea turtles and to report to Congress on such negotiations.
Second, § 609(b) requires the Secretaries of State, Commerce,
and Treasury to prohibit the importation of shrimp products
from all countries that have failed to mandate shrimp fishing
practices that provide sea turtle protection comparable to that
provided under U.S. law. Although TEDs are the primary
means to ensure comparable levels of sea turtle protection, foreign countries can also comply with § 609(b)'s requirements by
demonstrating that they use other turtle-safe shrimping practices.
One example of an alternative, non-TED, turtle-safe shrimping
practice is requiring fishermen to manually haul in their shrimp
nets, instead of using mechanical hauling devices.34
The certification program is the specific method by which the
goals of § 609(b) are achieved. The President of the United
States, acting through the Secretary of State, must officially certify that foreign countries have adopted fishing policies that adequately protect sea turtles. This certification must be supported
by credible evidence, not merely by the unsubstantiated declara32. Sea Thrtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244
(1987) .
. 33. Pub. L. No. 101-162, Title VI § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989) (codified as
amended at 16 V.S.C.A. § 1537 (West Supp. 1996» .
. 34. See BNA Int'l Trade Rep.-Apr. 1996, supra note 17, at 687. There i, currently
a debate as to whether raising shrimp in aquaculture ponds'should be recognized as
a valid shrimping practice under § 609. Although aquaculture ponds do not pose a
direct threat to sea turtles, they are nonetheless very damaging from an environmental standpoint. Particularly in Southeast Asia, the creation of aquaculture ponds has
often come at the expense of the destruction of natural mangrove forests. This has
had adverse impacts on both wildlife and fish habitat. Many environmentalists
maintain that recognizing aquaculture shrimp as "turtle-safe" under § 609's certification program would have the unfortunate effect of encouraging the spread of environmentally-destructive aquaculture activities.
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tions of foreign governments.35 Without this certification, and
the evidence to support it, t!le United States is required to block
the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from the foreign
country in question.36
Although the legislation creating the turtle protection program
was enacted in 1989, Congress postponed formal implementation
of § 609's certification program until May 1, 1991.37 Most likely,
Congress was aware that the administrative and economic consequences of the new law might be considerable. Administratively,
federal agencies would need time to develop more specific guidelines for certifying foreign countries, and for ensuring that uncertified shrimp was effectively banned from importation into the
U.S. Economically, foreign shrimp exporters committed to maintaining access to the U.S; market might need time to bring their
fishing practices into compliance. The delay in implementation
provided agencies and foreign countries with reasonable time period to anticipate and respond to the new law.
The economic reasoning behind, and the policy objectives of,
§ 609 were straightforward. The United States is a major purchaser of shrimp. According to a 1995 U.S. Commerce Department report, U.S. shrimp imports total more than $1.2 billion
annually.38 Foreign nations -that export shrimp have a clear interest in being able to sell their product in the lucrative U.S. market.
By conditioning access to the U.S. market on adherence to minimal sea turtle protection standards, foreign nations are encouraged to improve the environmental performance of their
shrimping industry. Moreover, the import requirement creates a
level-playing field for U.S. fishermen, who must already comply
with the 1987 turtle protection regulations.39
Although the language of § 609 stated that the sea turtle protection requirements applied to all countries, the State Department promulgated regulations that limited the geographic scope
35. Id. at 687-88.
36. Id. at 687.
37.Id.
38. Ruling Seen Barring. Most Shrimp Imports to U.S., Reuters (May 3, 1996)
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires file.
.
39. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2. "US shrimpers also hailed the decision, as it 'levels the playing field' in the competitive shrimp market while protecting
marine ecosystems." Id. "Foreign countries not using TEDs are willfully killing sea
turtles. It's way past time that shrimpers from all countries started using TEDs in
order to preserve our shared marine environment." Id. (quoting Jack d'Antignac,
U.S. shrimper and President of the Georgia Fishennan's Association).
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of this language. These regulations interpreted § 609 as applying
only to shrimp fishing nations in the Western Atlantic/Caribbean
region.40 The State Department justified this limited interpretation of § 609 on the grounds that Congress only intended the
TED requirement to apply to sea turtles that are harvested in, or
migrate through, U.S. coastal waters.41 As a result, § 609 was initially applied to only sixteen foreign "nations, fourteen of which
were found to be non-compliant.42
The real impetus behind the State Department's limiting regulation, however, had very little to do with U.S. coastal waters or
the migratory patterns of turtles. It had to do with the Bush and
Clinton Administrations' interest in avoiding a high-profile international trade dispute.43 Such a dispute could potentially undermine the United States' credibility as a free trade advocate, and
therefore undermine adqption and implementation of GATT and
NAFfA.44
III.
THE TURTLE ON TRIAL:
EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. CHRISTOPHER

The environmental and marine conservation community intensely criticized the State Department's decision to limit § 609's
application to Atlantic and Caribbean shrimp fishing nations. 45
The most prominent of these critics was Earth Island Institute
(Earth Island), a non-governmental organization based in San
Francisco, California. Earth Island directs the Sea Turtle Restoration Project, whose goal is the protection of "sea turtle populations in ways that meet the ecological needs of the sea turtles and
the needs of local communities who share the beaches and waters
with these endangered species."46
"
40. See Public Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 9,015-16 (1993).
41. See id.

42. See David Paget & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Protecting Endangered Species: Customs Court Becomes Potent Forum, N.Y.LJ., June 3, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, NYLawJ File [hereinafter Paget & Srolovic].
43. Judge Says Law to Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. ~, 1996, at A9. "The issue arose during the Bush Administration when the State
Department complained that enforcing the sea turtle law would hurt countries that
,exported up to $3 billion worth of shrimp to the United States." Id.
44. Stephen J. Orava, Court Decision on Shrimping Undermines U.S. Trade Policy
WASH. LEGAL FOUN!? LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, May 24, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, WLF File.
45. See Bishop, supra note 14, at A13.
46. SEA TURTLE RESTORATION PROJECT, VIVA LA'TORTUGA 12 (1996).
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For many years, Earth Island has played a leading role in educating consumers, national governments, and the fishing industry
about the threats to sea.turtles and the pressing need for TEDs.47
The group has undertaken scientific research regarding sea turtles, and political organizing to promote turtle conservation.48
The Sea Turtle Restoration Project has established strong partnerships with conservation groups in Southeast Asia and Central
America. 49 Prompt and frill implementation of the turtl~ protection program's § 609 was a major policy goal for Earth Island,
because such implementation would likely result in greater
worldwide use of TEDs.50 The State Department's narrow interpretation of the provision's geographic scope threatened to undercut this goal.
In February 1992, Earth Island filed suit in federal district
court in San Francisco, challenging the State Department regulations limiting the application of § 609.51 In its complaint, Earth
Island asked the court for two remedies: (1) an order compelling
the State Department to initiate negotiations regarding sea turtle
protection with all foreign governments that export shrimp to the
U.S.; and (2) an order compelling the State Department, as well
as other federal agencies, to apply the shrimp certification requirements to all foreign countries, regardless of geographic 10cation.52' The defendants responded initially to the suit not by
challenging the legal merits of Earth Island's claim, but by contending that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The State Department maintained
that the United States Court of International Trade (Court of International Trade), located in New York City, had exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving import and export restrictions, and
asked that the case be dismissed.53
The State Departmenf's subject matter argument was based on
the Customs Court Act of 1980.54 This law was enacted to clarify
47. Press Release of Earth Island Institute, Protest Targeted at Mexican President
Salinas Over Slaughter of Endangered Sea Thrties, (Sept. 23, 1993) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Earth Island Press Release].
48. See SEA TURTLE RESTORATION PROJECT, VIVA LA TORTUGA 12 (1996).
49. Earth Island Press Release, supra note 47.
50.Id.
51. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Conservation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996).
52.Id.
53.Id.
54. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201,94 Stat. 1728 (1980)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1584 (1994). The Court's jurisdiction ex-
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the jurisdictional relationship between the United States Customs Court (Customs Court) and the federal district courts. 55
The Customs Court, established in 1926, was intended to provide
a specialized forum for handling legal issues concerning embargoes and tariffs. In 1980, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of
the Customs Court to include "new and increased responsibilities
in the field of international trade litigation, particularly with regard to antidumping and countervailing duty cases."56
Although the 1926 and 1970 laws appeared to give the Customs Court jurisdiction over most embargo and tariff disputes,
there remained considerable uncertainty as to whether it retained exclusive jurisdiction, or merely concurrent jurisdiction
with federal district courtS.57 This uncertainty led to a troubling
siWation, wherein different federal district courts and federal circuits were rendering different interpretations of U.S. trade law.
Moreover, because Customs Court decisions were not accorded a
higher legal status than federal district court decisions, the Customs Court was unable to promote uniform application of U.S.
trade law. This, in turn, undermined the primary reason the Customs Court was established in the first place, namely to provide
clarity and expertise in a field of law that was becoming increasmgly specialized.58 Ironically, the Customs Court was spawning
the very confusion that it was intended to curtai1.59
The Customs Court Act of 1980 was passed to help resolve
jurisdictional uncertainty in the area of U.S. trade law. First, the
name of the Customs Court was changed to the Court of Internatends to civil suits involving certain specified import transactions, such as classification and valuation of merchandise, charging duties and fees on the importation of
merchandise, the exclusion of merchandise from entry under provisions of the customs laws, the liquidation of entries, and challenges to antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
55. See generally Gregory Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of International
Trade: Remarks of the Honorable Gregory W. Carman at the Conference for Dispute
Resolution on February 27-28,1992,13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 245 (1992), available
in LEXIS, Lawrev Library, Allrev File [hereinafter Carman].
56. Scott H. Segal & Stephen J. Orava, Playing the Zone and Controlling the
Board: The Emerging Jurisdictional Consensus and the Court of International Trade,
44 AM. V.L. REv. 2393 (1995) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1980» [hereinafter Playing the Zone].
57. Carman, supra note 55, at 247.
. 58. See generally Andrew P. Vance, The Unrealized Jurisdiction of 28 U.S.c.
§1581 (i): A View From the Plaintiffs Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 793 (1984).
59. Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R. 6394 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congo
7 (1980).
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tional Trade (CIT), to more accurately reflect the broad range of
issues the court was charged with overseeing. Second, and more
importantly, the law expressly expanded the jurisdiction of the
Customs Court, and provided the court with exclusive, rather
than merely concurrent, jurisdiction in the area of international
embargo and tariff disputes.6o
While the Customs Court Act of 1980 was welcomed by most
trade lawyers and the international business community, it was
viewed less enthusiastically by most environmental protection
advocates. Environmentalists were skeptical about a panel of
"trade experts" empowered to judge the appropriateness of import or export restrictions related to environmental protection.61
Given the Customs Court's specialized focus on economics and
trade, there was concern that the judges would be ill-equipped to
evaluate environmental issues, or that environmental policies
would be accorded subordinate status to free trade considerations. 62 These concerns led environmentalists to resist efforts to
provide the CIT with exclusive jurisdietion over conflicts relating
to conservation-related trade restrictions.
Environmentalists' mistrust of the CIT also grew as a result of
a ruling by an international tribunal, established by the' General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).63 In 1991, a GATT
dispute panel ruled that a U.S. law banning the import of tuna
caught in driftnets violated international trade rules-. 64 This ruling provoked a flood of international criticism, and caused many
environmentalists to ask whether trade-focused adjudicatory
bodies were the appropriate forums to resolve global conservation issues.65 In the eyes of many environmentalists, the CIT was
subject to the same shortcomings, namely pro-trade ideological
inclinations, as the GATT.66
60. See 126 CONGo REc. 27,063 (1980).
61. See Playing the Zone, supra note 56, at 2426.
62. See Daniel Magraw, NAFTA's Repurcussions: Is Green Trade Possible?, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1994 at 14, 19.
63. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade: No Country Can Protect
Its Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21.
64. See GAIT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U. S. Restrictions on Imports
of Thna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1598 (1991) [hereinafter GAIT Thna Report].
65. See Hamilton Southworth III, Comment, GATT and the Environment, 32 VA.
J. INT'L L. 997 (1992). See also Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S.
Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna!
Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2098 (1992).
66. See Playing the Zone, supra note 56, at 2426. This article discussed why environmentalists may be skeptical about the CIT:
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Given the uncertainties of, and unfamiliarity with, the CIT's
environmental jurisprudence, the sea turtle litigation was initiated by taking what was perceived as the path of least resistance.
In 1993 Earth Island first attempted to enforce § 609 in federal
district court.67 In response to the State Department's contention that the CIT was the proper forum, Earth Island argued that
a ban on imports was an environmental and not a trade barrier,
and as such was beyond the CIT's expertise and jurisdiction.68
The federal district court rejected Earth Island's contention, as
did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In upholding the district
court's dismissal, Judge Schroder of the Ninth Circuit observed
that "embargoes are imposed for a broad range of purposes, including public health, safety, morality, foreign affairs interests,
law enforcement, and ecology."69 The Court found, however,
that even if an embargo has an underlying purpose other than
trade, that does not make it any less an embargo. Judge Schroder's majority opinion thus concluded that legal questions surrounding § 609's shrimp embargo provisions fell squarely within
the exclusive junsdiction of the CIT.70
In its 1993 opinion upholding the federal district court's dismissal of Earth Island's .claim on subject matter jurisdiction
grounds, the Ninth Circuit also ruled on the separation of powers
issue. This issue .involved § 609(a), which requited the State Department to initiate negotiations with foreign countries regarding
sea turtle protection policies.71 Given that the CIT was found to
have exclusive jurisdiction over the case, the Ninth Circuit's decision to rule on the constitutionality of § 609(a) was, at least from
a jurisdictional standpoint, somewhat unorthodox.72 This point
The notion that trade law should be centralized has both its proponents as well as
its opponents. In the case of centralizing authority for international trade, issues in
a specialized tribunal, trade law purists might applaud the precision, coherence,
and accuracy that results. Critics of the prevailing structure of the trade system,
however, might oppose centralization on much the same grounds. For example,
the environmental community opposed the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement in part because the cloistered community of trade "experts"
seemed to place inadequate emphasis on public participation and overarching en'
. vironmental principles.

Id.
67. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Conservation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996).
68. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 651.
70. See id. at 652.
71. See id. at 652-54.
72. See id. at 654-56.
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was not lost on Judge Brunetti, who in a dissenting opinion
maintained:
Because section 609 as a whole is a "law providing for embargoes
or other quantitative restrictions," both the claims under 609(a)
and 609(b) arise out of it, and both claims lie within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CIT. This court is therefore without jurisdiction
and is powerless to rule on the constitutionality of 609(a) at this
time.73

Writing for the majority, Judge Schroder disagreed with Judge
Brunetti's analysis. Concluding that only § 609(b) concerned
subject matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT, Judge
Schroder determined that the Ninth Circuit possessed the authority, and should take the opportunity, to resolve the constitutional issues relating to § 609(a) at this juncture in the.
litigation.74 In considering the issue, the majority found that
"[t]his Court has not and cannot lawfully order the Executive to
comply with the terms of a statute that impinges upon power exclusively granted to the Executive Branch under the Constitution."75 As such, because § 609(a) intruded on the Executive's
discretion in the field of foreign relations, the Ninth Circuit
found the provision to be beyond the scope of judicial
enforcement.
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Earth Island's only
course of legal redress lay with the CIT. Although the prospects
for a pro-conservation CIT decision appeared slim in 1993, a
1995 CIT decision indicated that the court was heading in a more
progressive environmental direction~ In Florsheim Shoe Co. v.
United States, a U.S. importer challenged an import ban on shoes
manufactured in Taiwan from Finnish elk skin.16 The import ban
was based on the Pelly Amendment to the 1967 Fishermen's Protection Act, which allows the President to restrict the importation of any products from countries that engage in the
endangered species trade.77 Although Finnish elk were not considered an endangered species, Taiwan was a major importer of
endangered rhinoceros and tiger body parts. It was Taiwan'.s participation in the rhinoceros and tiger trade, which is forbidden
73. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1993) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Brunetti).
74. See id. at 654.
75. Id. at 653.
76. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995).
77. 22 U.S.C.A. §1978(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996).

70

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 15:57

under the 1972 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), that led the
U.S. to impose the Pelly Amendment's ban on all wildlife imports from the country.78
In Florsheim, the plaintiff argued that the Pelly Amendment
could only be invoked if a country was trading in endangered
species that had been taken from the wild within its own borders.79 According to the plaintiff, because Taiwan had imported
the rhinoceros and tiger parts from other countries, the import
ban was inappropriate and should be lifted. 80 In a strongly
worded opinion, the CIT rejected the plaintiff's interpretation
and upheld the import ban. According to the CIT, allowing Taiwan to profit from the type of destructive commerce that CITES
expressly prohibits would condone "the very mischief the President sought to to avert."81
The CIT's ruling in Florsheim indicated that Earth Island's
-prospects might not be so bleak. Given the CIT's willingness to
aggressively enforce the Pelly Amendment and CITES, perhaps
environmentalists' fear of institutional and ideological bias in the
CIT had been unfounded. 82 Such, at least, were the questions
and possibilities that surfaced after the Florsheim decision.
Thus. with the jurisdictional question finally resolved and Florsheim on the books, the 1995 CIT case of Earth Island v. Christopher picked up where the 1993 federal district court case of Earth
Island v. Christopher had left off. At last, the substantive 'phase
of the sea turtle litigation was underway.
The government-defendants responded to Earth Island's claim
with two basic arguments. First, they argued that Earth Island
lacked standing to bring the suit, because the group did not have
a legally sufficient interest in ensuring § 609's full implementation. 83 Second, the government argued that the State Department's regulation limiting the geographic scope of § 609 was a
reasonable interpretation of the underlying legislation.84
The government's challenge to Earth Island's standing was
based primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 ruling in Lu78. See Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42.
79. See Florsheim, 880 F. Supp. at 850.
80.Id.
81. Id. at 853.
82. See Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42.
83. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 564-66 (Ct. InCI Trade
1995).
84. See id. at 567-69.
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jan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 85 In Lujan, the Supreme Court denied standing to a non-governmental organization (NGO) that
sought judicial review of U.S. government funded projects that
were likely to injure endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka.
The plaintiffs in Lujan were members of the NGO who had been
engaged in the scientifi~ study of the endangered species
threatened by the projects. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
concluded that the plaintiffs' connection to the species and the
projects was too speculative, and that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer "actual
or imminent" harm to their personal interests.86 Additionally,
Justice Scalia expressed his disdain for public interest litigation
per se, insisting that "[v]indicating the public interest ... is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive."87
If Justice Scalia's opinion was interpreted broadly, the Lujan
decision posed a serious obstacle to public interest environmental lawsuits. Since the early 1970s, such lawsuits had played a
critical role in improving compliance with and enforcement of
environmental law.88 This was true for two primary reasons.
First, environmental agencies often lacked the resources to monitor and enforce environmental laws against private parties, and
public interest lawsuits supplemented agency efforts.89 Second,
because the government does not, or often legally cannot sue itself, public interest litigation is often the only means to ensure
that the government is complying with environmental laws. 90
Lujan presented a challenge to the legal viability of such
litigation.
Earth Island v. Christopher provided the CIT with a high-profile opportunity to help define the reach, or limits, of the Lujan
85. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). For an excellent discussion of the decision's constitutional implications, as well as a critique of its underlying analysis, see Cass Sunstein, whiu's Standing After Lujan: Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries", and Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
86. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2138-39.
87. Id. at 2145 (emphasis added).
88. See MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CmZEN SUITS 1-2 to 1-11 (1993)
[hereinafter AXLINE]. "Any thoughtful observer must be impressed with the level of
government and private sector accountability that has been achieved through the
device of the citizen suit." Id. at 1-10 to 1-11.
89. See generally J. Henry Habicht, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: The Enforcement Community's Role, 2 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. (1987).
90. See generally Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with RCRA and
Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 513 (1986).
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decision. The CIT responded with a ruling that, although still
consistent with Lujan's analytical framework, represented a significant departure from the spirit of Justice Scalia's 1992 opinion.91 The CIT found that Earth Island had demonstrated its
members' longstanding interest in sea turtle conservation, and
also demonstrated that the government's failure to implement
§ 609 presented an immediate and imminent danger to this interest, and that the relief sought (full enforcement of § 609) would
provide effective redress to the identified harm.92 The Court
therefore held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
government's compliance with legislation protecting sea turtles.
As Judge Aquilino surmised: "Suffice it to state that this court
cannot and therefore does not find that the [plaintiffs] are within
the realm of 'pure speculation and fantasy' here, that is, that they
fail to show any 'perceptible harm' or to show that they are
within the 'zone of interests to be protected by the statute' in
question. "93
Although they welcomed the CIT's rilling on the standing issue, some environmental advocates were disappointed that Judge
Aquilino's opinion did not undertake a more rigorous application and more deliberate modification of Lujan.94 Such language
would have proven extremely useful for environmental litigants.
Nonetheless, the CIT's take on Lujan was good news not only to
Earth Island, but to environmental advocates in general. It suggested that, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dislike (expressed in
Lujan's dicta) of public interest litigation per se, Lujan's new
standing requirements shoilld not present a major procedural
hurdle for non-governmental groups seeking to ensure environmental compliance through judicial review. As Nicole Walthall,
an attorney for Earth Island, commented after the decision:
"This case also set an important precedent on the issue of standing for environmental and conservation plaintiffs .... [T]his decision clearly establishe[d] environmental plaintiffs' right to seek
judicial enforcement of U.S. laws ... aimed at the global protection of threatened and endangered animals."95
91. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 566-67 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995).

92. See id. at 567.
93. [d. (quoting Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1283 (1995)).
94. Telephone Interview with Deborah Sivas and Nicole Walthall, attorneys, Conservation Law Project (Oct. 23, 1996).
95. VIVA LA TORTUGA, supra note 3, at 2.
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The CIT next turned its attention to the government's second
main argument, whether the State Department's interpretation
of § 609 limiting its application to Atlantic and Caribbean foreign
nations was reasonable. In the 1984 case of Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,96 the U.S. Supreme Court established a two part test for reviewing administrative interpretations
of law. First, the court will consider whether the meaning of the
legislative provision in question is clear and unambiguous. If so,
the court will adopt this clear and unambiguous meaning, regardless of the agency's previous interpretation.97 Second, if the legislative provision is not clear and unambiguous, the court will
uphold the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable.98 Under
Chevron's administrative law framework, an agency's reasonable
interpretation will be upheld even if the court, considering the
issue de novo, might have opted for an alternative
interpretation.99
Employing the first prong of the administrative review methodology established in Chevron, the CIT asked whether the
underlying legislative provision, § 609, was "clear and unambiguOUS."lOO The CIT found that § 609's language requiring that the
shrimp certification program be applied to all foreign countries
was indeed clear and unambiguous.1 01 According to the Court,
the meaning of the word all is plain enough. It means all, not
some.
The CIT therefore held that the State Department's interpretation of § 609, which limited the geographic scope of the shrimp
certification program was not the clear interpretation of § 609,
and thus the State Department's interpretation was unreasonable
and invalid.102 The court issued an order compelling the federal
government to prohibit the importation of shrimp or shrimp
products into the United States from all.foreign nations that have
not reduced sea turtle mortality from shrimp fishing operations
by ninety-seven percent, the level that can be achieved through
96: 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id. at 843.
98. Id. at 844.
99. Id. at 845.
100. Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F.Supp. 559, 575 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1995).
See also CIT Hands Plaintiffs Decision That Could Result in Shrimp Embargoes,
Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No.3 (Jan. 17, 1993), at 73.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 578-79.
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the use of TEDs.I03 Furthermore, the CIT ordered the government to comply with the order no later th?n May 1, 1996.104
In yet another effort to avoid compliance with the May 1,1996
deadline, the government petitioned the CIT for a hearing to
consider extending the compliance deadline an additional
year. !Os In its petition, the government maintained that there
were administrative considerations that made compliance within
the proposed timeframe impossible. The court granted this petition, and in April 1996 held a hearing to consider the government's request.
At this hearing, the government's request for extension was
denied. In a stinging opinion, CIT Judge Thomas Aquilino declared that "the paucity of evidence offered in support of this
motion enables this decision to be expeditious,"106 and that
"§ 609's mandate to negotiate as soon as possible and to apprise
Congress not later that one year after the date of enactment
hardly bespeaks an additional anum of delay more than six year
after that date."107
Judge Aquilino further added that the evidentiary "inadequacy" of the government's petition might warrant sanctions
under CIT Rule 11. This rule forbids parties from submitting
motions primarily intended to "harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."108 Although,
in the interest of ending the litigation, Judge Aquilino chose not
to pursue Rule 11 sanctions, he warned that the government's
motion for extension caused "exactly the kind of confusion which
the rule [was] adopted to prevent. " 109
The most recent development in the sea turtle litigation came
in October 1996. In response to the CIT's December 1995 and
April 1996 decisions, the State Department promulgated new
regulations to implement the shrimp certification program. Ito
103. See id. at 579-80.
104. Id. at 580.
105. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616, 618 (Ct. InCl Trade
1996).
106. Id. at 618.
107. Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (quoting CIT Rule 11).
109. Id. at 626. See also Paget & Srolovic, supra note 42, at S6: "But for the
paramount interest in ending litigation, the court stated, it would have ordered the
defendants to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under the CIT's Rule
11 for seeking the extension of time to comply with the law without an adequate
basis."
110. Public Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996). The regulation provides, in part:
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These regulations held that a foreign country would be certified
so long as the particular shrimp being imported into the U.S.
were caught using turtle-safe methods. 111 Under the regulations,
foreign nations did not have to demonstrate that their entire
shrimping fleet was turtle-safe to be certified. 112 As such, the
regulations represented yet another effort to limit the scope of
§ 609.

In response, Earth Island filed a motion with the CIT contend-

ing that the State Department regulations were not in conformity
with § 609 and the December 1995 and April 1996 CIT rulings.1l3
According to Earth Island, the State Department regulations
"eviscerated" 114 Congress's purposes because foreign
"[c]ountries can evade the Law's embargo by exporting to the
United States those shrimp caught by a few designated vessels
which are equipped with TEDs, while exporting elsewhere
shrimp caught by those which are not."115
The CIT agreed with the plaintiffs, and issued yet another
strongly worded opinion against the Clinton Administration.
Judge Aquilino held:
They [the State Department] blame this litigation for their approach now. But the regime upon which it is based has governed
them since May 1, 1991, and been part of the United States Code
before then. Certainly they have had ample opportunity to propose, if not realize, legislative amelioration of what is now clearly
perceived to be a daunting remedy. Perhaps the reason this has
not happened is that the harm the remedy attempts to' allay has
been equally well-understood, by both President and the
Congress. 116

The turtle, it appeared, had at last navigated its way to victory
in court.
The Department of State has detennined that, in order to achieve effective implementation of Section 609 on a world-wide basis, beginning May 1 1996 [sic], all
shipments of shrimp and products of shrimp into the United States must be accompanied by a declaration ... attesting that the shrimp accompanying the declaration
was harvested either under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles ... or
in waters subject to the jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to Section 609.

Id.
111.
112.
113.
1996).
.114.
115.
116.

See id.
See id.
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, No. 96-165, slip op. (Ct. Int'J Trade Oct. 8,
'
Id. at 6 (quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3).

Id.
Id. at 15-16.

76

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol.15:57

IV.
A CONFLICT EMERGING: THE EARTH ISLAND RULING
AND GATT

In addition to arguments based on standing and the reasona.bleness of the State Department's regulations, the defendants in
the Earth Island litigation also offered a third contention in support of their limited geographic application of § 609. This third
contention focused on the United States' international free trade
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).!17 According to the government, the shrimp certification program established under § 609 conflicted with GATT's
trade rules; therefore federal agencies, as well as the CIT, should
interpret § 609 to minimize or avoid these conflicts.l1S
In support of this contention, the federal government focused
on Articles III, XI and XX of GATT. Article III states that
GATT contracting parties may employ domestic regulations affecting the import of other contracting parties, so long as these
regulations do not discrimip.ate between foreign and domestic
products (like-treatment principle). Article XI provides that,
subject to certain limited exceptions, a GATT contracting nation
shall not impose quantitative import restrictions or embargoes on
the product of another GATT contracting party.1 19 Article XX
lists the exceptions which justify a deviation from the basic free
trade rules articulated in Articles III and XI. Among these exceptions are trade restrictions "necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life and health,"120 and measures "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources."121
To help resolve conflicts among contracting parties, the GATT
frequently convenes dispute panels. 122 Several of these quasi-ad117. See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 579 (Ct. Int'l Trade,
1995). "An ancillary argument, pressed by the intervenor, is that 'there are very
serious questions relating to the consistency of [section 609] with U.S. GATT obligations.'" Id. (quoting Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenor at 44).
118. See id. at 579. Defendants maintained that "it is appropriate to seek to minimize or reduce conflict to the maximum extent possible. In this case, this means
construing [s]ection 609 so that it affects the fewest nations and products possible,
consistent with its basic statutory purposes." Id. (quoting Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenor at 44).
119. GATT art. XI(1).
120. GATT art. XX(b).
121. GATT art. XX(g).
122. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is both an agreement
and an organization. The organization, which is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, is charged with implementing the GATT agreement. As a result of the 1994
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judicatory panels have considered the relation of environmental
trade measures to GAIT's free trade requirements. The two
most significant panel rulings concerned a Canadian restriction
on the export of unprocessed salmon and herring,123 and a
United States restriction on the import of tuna caught in purseseine nets.
In the Canadian fish processing dispute, Canada argued that its
processing requirement was justified under Articles XX(b) and
XX(g). Canada maintained that the provision was closely related
to th~ country's efforts to prevent over-fishing by ensuring that
Canadian fishermen did not lose the value of their more limited
catch.124 The GAIT disagreed, concluding that the processing
requirement was not "necessary" to protect fish stocks, and that
its primary purpose was to protect the domestic fishing industry,
not to promote conservation. 125
,
In the tuna purse-seine controversy, discussed earlier, the
GAIT considered a U.S. law banning the import of tuna caught
in a manner that results in a high dolphin mortality rate.126 The
United States offered two arguments in defense of its import restriction. First, it argued that the restriction did not violate Article III, because the ban on purse-seine-tuna appli~d to both
domestic and foreign parties. Second, the United States claimed
that, even if the import restriction was found to violate Article
III, it was justified under Articles XX(g)'s conservation exception. The GAIT rejected both of these arguments. 127 First, it
found that the import restriction applied to production methods
(fishing practices), not products, and that GAIT did not permit
production-based trade restrictions.1 28 Second, the panel found
that because the restriction was "primarily aimed" at forcing
Uruguay Round, the name of the GATT organization was changed to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
123. Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989).
124. /d.
125. 'See generally Ted L. Mc Dorman, International Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, 7:4 J. Int'l Arb.
107-21 (1990).
126. See generally GATT Thna Report, supra note 64, at 1599. In addition to the
1992 GATT Thna Report, there was a second GATT .dispute panel report on the
issue in 1994. In referring to the tuna-driftnet controversy, I am referring collectively the 1992 and 1994 GATT panel decisions.
127. Id. at 1603, 1607.
128. GATT Tuna-Dolphin II: Environmental Protection Continues to Clash With
Free Trade (1994 Report by Center for International Environmental Law), at 2.
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other countries to change their policies, not marine conservation,
it did not fall within the meaning of Article XX(g).129
There are at least three principles that appear to emerge from
the Canadian fish processing and U.S. tuna import rulings. First,
Article Ill's like-treatment requirement applies only to products,
not production methods. Second, if a national conservation measure provides significant economic benefits to a national industry, it may violate GATT even if it also has some proenvironmental goals. Third, national policies that aim to force
other countries to change their environmental policies are not
justified under Article XX(g).
In the Earth Island litigation, these rulings and principles provided the legal background for the defendants' contention that
§ 609 was inconsistent with the United States' GATT obligations.
The government argued that broad application of § 609 would
likely prompt a formal GATT challenge, and that, under principles established in previous panel r~lings, the U.S. was likely to
lose this challenge.13° In considering this argument, the CIT conceded that it was appropriate to "seek to minimize or reduce conflict to the maximum extent possible ... consistent with [§ 609's]
basic statutory purposes."l3l The CIT also stated, however, that
"the record of enforcement of section 609 to date does not reveal
troubling tensions with the foreign sovereigns already deemed
covered, including those not certified positively and thus subject
to embargoes."132 As such, the CIT seemed to suggest that
§ 609's alleged conflict with GATT was too speculative to warrant limiting the application of the shrimp certification program.
Although not addressed directly by the CIT, there may be an
additional reason for rejecting the government's argument concerning the impact of U.S. GATT obligations. Increasingly, trade
and environmental experts have begun to question the legal
grounds supporting the distinction between measures regulating
products, and measures regulating production methods. 133 More
specifically, there is now considerable support for the position
that Article Ill's like-treatment rules relating to products have
been fundamentally misunderstood, and misapplied, by GATT
129. [d. at 4.
130. See Earth Island In~t. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp 559, 579 (Ct. Int'I Trade
1995).
131. [d. at 579 (quoting Memorandum of Defendant-Intervenor).
132. [d. at 579.
133. See Arden-Clarke, The Cruel Trade-Off, THE GUARDIAN (London, Sept. II,
1991), available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File.
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dispute panels. 134 Steve Charnovitz, Director or Yale's Global
Environment and Trade Study, has provided perhaps the most
comprehensive reassessment of Article III, and of the product/
production method distinction. 135
Charnovitz maintains that, at the time GATT was adopted in
1947, there were already many longstanding examples of trade
restrictions based on production methods relating to environmental and health concerns.136 Although GATT dispute panels,
and many trade experts, have assumed that the 1947 agreement
sought to outlaw these existing measures, Charnovitz finds no evidence to support this assumption. 137 Conversely, he maintains
that GATT actually reaffirmed the appropriateness of such production-based measures, and that a '''good case can be made that
the GATT has green rootS."138 Charnovitz thus concludes, "The
issue is not whether process standards are acceptable as trade
rules. That was settled decades ago. The issue is what specific
standards are appropriate."139
While the CIT did not find it necessary to reconsider the product/production method distinction in Earth Island v. Christopher,
the World Trade Organization (WTO) may soon have such an
opportunity. The WTO is th,e successor organization to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and is now charged with
overseeing the agreement's implementation. In response to the
CIT's April 1996 decision, many nations, including all six members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
protested the U.S. ruling to the'WTO's Council for Trade in
Goods.1 40 In July 1996, Suvit 'Khunkitti, Thailand's Agriculture
and Cooperatives Minister, warned that if the United States does
134. See DANIEL C. EsrY, GREENING THE
THE FUTURE 51 (1994).

GATT:

TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND

This differentiation between products and production processes cannot be sustained in an ecologically interdependent world. For example, to say a nation must
accept an imported semiconductor because it physically resembles a domestically
produced semiconductor is absurd if the product was made in violation of the
Montreal Protocol, restricting the use of chemicals harmful to the ozone layer.

[d.
135. Steve Chamovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTI.. L.J. 299 (1994).
136. [d. at 348-49.
137. [d. at 340.
138. [d. at 349.
139. Steve Chamovtiz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOM~CS AND POLICY 269-70 (1993).
140. Candace Batycki, Trade War Over Turtles?, EARTH ISLAND JOURNAL 9
(Summer 1996).

<
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not ease the ban, ASEAN members will raise the issue at the
World Trade Organization's December 1996 meeting in
Singapore.141
The WTO recently had its first major opportunity to consider
the trade-environment nexus. From an environmental standpoint, the results were not encouraging. In May 1996, the WTO
Appellate Body, a new judicial forum created under the 1994
Uruguay Round to the GATT, reviewed United States' Clean
Air Act legislation concerning taxes and restrictions on the import of refined gasoline.142 It concluded that the U.S. legislation
violated GATT's trade rules. 143 In its decision, the WTO Appellate Body criticized the United States for failing to take into account the costs the Clean Air Act provisions would place on
foreign oil producers, and for failing to pursue "cooperative negotiations" with foreign governments before imposing the restrictions. l44 This ruling appears to place new hurdles in the path of
nations seeking to defend environmental-based trade
restrictions.
If a formal challenge is brought before the WTO regarding the
U.S. shrimp certification program, the CIT's resolution of the
GATT-consistency issue will likely prove inadequate. Once a
formal WTO challenge is filed, the "troubling tensions" that
were absent in the CIT case will be plainly present, and the issue
will no longer be a m<l;Uer of mere legal speculation. If events
proceed along this path, and a WTO dispute panel is convened to
resolve the issue, several difficult questions may arise. Should
the WTO reject the product/production method distinction recognized in earlier panel decisions? Was the United States
obliged to undertake a detailed analysis of the impact of foreign
trade partners, or pursue cooperative negotiations, before banning shrimp imports? If the WTO finds § 609 inconsistent with
international'trade rules, should the U.S. Congress amend the
law, or should the U.S. courts reevaluate the CIT's April 1996
decision? The answers to these questions will determine the
course of the U.S. sea turtle.protection program.
141. Ron Corben, Thailand Targets U.S. Curbs on Shrimp, J. COM., July 19, 1996.
142. See WTO Report of the Appellate Body in United States, Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/AB/R (Apr. 261996), reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
143. See id.
144. Steve Charnovitz, New WTO Adjudication and Its Implications for the Environment, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 851 (Sept. 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, Intenv File.
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v.
CONCLUSION: PROGRESS SWIMS AHEAD

The sea turtle is swimming into a complex and unknown future. The CIT's ruling in Earth Island v. Christopher indicates
that marine conservation advocates have managed to make progress on the international trade front. The CIT's decision has
helped elevate the legal status of global conservation and environmental protection goals. This victory, however, may be shortlived. In addition to the emerging GAIT challenge, there have
also been calls for Congress to amend § 609. As the Food Institute Report, an industry publication opposed to the shrimp import ban, suggested, "[l]egislative relief is not to be ruled out
either."145 These WTO .and Congressional efforts threaten to
weaken, and perhaps overturn, the CIT's landmark decision.
At least for now, however, the sea turtle has managed to
achieve some degree of justice. This justice is of the most basic
and essential nature. It is based on the right to exist, the right to
not be driven into extinction by outdated and destructive fishing
practices. 146 As the World Trade Organization, and perhaps the
U.S. Congress, tum their attention to the issue, this right to exist
must not be submerged beneath the technical language that often
dominates the trade policy arena. The fate of the sea turtle must
remain on the surface of the debate.

145. u.s. Wild Shrimp Embargo Looming, Food Institute Report (Feb. 19, 1996),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File. "Legislative relief is not to be ruled
out either and some legislators are said to be considering introducing a measure that
would at least delay the deadline to allow foreign producers to comply." [d.
146. Le Dieu Duc & Steven Broad, Exploitation of Hawksbill Turtles in Vietnam,
15 TRAFFIC BULL. 77 (1995). See also Joel Simon, Mexico's Turmoil Victimizing Sea
Turtles, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 1996, at A12.

